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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Dr. Eileen Wright appeals the District Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order on 
Appeal of Administrative Order filed on July 21, 2008. This Memorandum Opinion and Order was 
issued after briefing and argument on Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review, which petition 
appealed two Final Orders of Respondent Board or Psychologist Examiners of the State of Idaho 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), dated April 22, 2005 and April 19, 2006. These two Final 
Orders imposed professional discipline on Dr. Wright, including the suspension of her professional 
license and assessment of a fine and costs and fees incurred by the Board. 
B. Procedural and Factual History 
Respondent refers to and incorporates by reference the Procedural Background in the 
District Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order on Appeal of Administrative Order for the factual 
and procedural history of this case. Record, pp. 12 - 14. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Proceedings before the Board and judicial review of the actions of the Board is 
governed by chapter 52, title 67 of the Idaho Code, otherwise known as the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act. LC. §§ 54-2305(f), 67-5207. A strong presumption of validity favors an agency's 
actions. Cooper v. Board of Prof'/ Discipline of the Idaho State Bd. Of Medicine, 134 Idaho 449, 
454, 4 P.3d 561, 566 (2000). The agency's action may be set aside, however, if the agency's 
findings, conclusions, or decisions (a) violate constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) exceed the 
agency's statutory authority; ( c) are made upon unlawful procedure; ( d) are not supported by 
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or ( e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
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discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). In addition, the Court will affirm an agency action unless a substantial 
right of the appellant has been prejudiced. I.C. § 67-5279(4). 
Judicial review is confined to the record. Jefferson County v. Eastern Idaho Reg. 
Med. Ctr., 126 Idaho 392,394,883 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ct. App. 1994)(citing LC. 67-5277, -5279(1)). 
The Court will defer to the agency's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous and 
unsupported by evidence in the record. Cooper, 134 Idaho at 454, 4 P.3d at 566. The Court may not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on factual matters. Id. 
Factual determinations by administrative agencies should be overturned only upon a showing of a 
clearly erroneous decision or an abuse of discretion. Jefferson County, 126 Idaho at 394, 883 P.2d 
at 1086 (citing I.C. 67-5279(3)(d), (3)). If the order is not affirmed, it shall be set aside in whole or 
in part and the case remanded. I.C. 67-5279(3)(e). 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. The Board is Entitled to Its Fees and Costs Pursuant to J.C.§ 12-117. 
The Board is entitled to an award of its fees and costs on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-
117. The Board is a state agency within the meaning of LC.§ 12-117 and is thus entitled to an award 
of its fees and costs if the Court finds in its favor and finds that Appellant acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. Id. Appellant's brief contains little legal support for her arguments. Appellant 
asks the Court to rule upon issues raised for the first time on appeal. And, Appellant spends the 
majority of her brief asking the Court to address issues that were never decided by the District Court 
in the proceeding below. Additionally, Appellant asks this Court to make determinations based on 
evidence that is not in the record on appeal. Her arguments are without a reasonable basis in fact 
or law and the Board is entitled to an award of its fees and costs. 
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B. Appellant's Brief Appendices are Improper 
Appellant has included four appendices to her brief, which documents are not 
contained within the Clerk's Record on appeal. This attempt to provide additional documents to this 
Court outside the requirements of the Idaho Appellate Rules is improper, and these documents 
should be disregarded by the Court. 
In her Notice of Appeal Appellant requested that "the entirety of the Clerk's record 
pursuant to I.AR. Rule 28 be provided and included in the record on appeal." R., p. 24. The Clerk's 
Record that was filed on October 30, 2008 and provided to the Parties conformed to the requirements 
of I.AR. Rule 28 as per Appellant's very request. Appellant did not request that any other document 
in the District Court's record be included in the Clerk's Record on appeal. If, after the Clerk's 
Record became settled, Appellant wanted to augment that record, I.A.R. Rule 30(a) requires that 
augmentation to the record must be done either by stipulation or by motion to this Court. Appellant 
has neither sought a stipulation with Respondent nor filed a motion with this Court to augment the 
record. As such, her appendices to her brief must be disregarded as they have not been properly 
made a part of the record on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Wright's Petition From the First Final Order, dated April 22, 2005. is Untimely. 
1. Appellant's Petition Was Untimely 
As the District Court properly found, Appellant's attempt to file a petition for judicial 
review of the Board's April 2005 Final Order was untimely, and the District Court lacked 
jurisdiction to consider the same. Idaho Code Section 67-5273(2) states that a petition for judicial 
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review must be filed twenty-eight (28) days after the decision on a motion for reconsideration. Idaho 
Code Section 67-5246(4) discusses the effectiveness of Final Orders and states: 
Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule, any party may file a 
motion for reconsideration of any final order issued by the agency 
head within fourteen (14) day of the issuance of that order. The 
agency head shall issue a written order disposing of the petition. The 
petition is deemed denied if the agency head does not dispose of it 
within twenty-one (21) days after the filing of the petition. 
The Idaho Bureau of Occupational Licenses and the Idaho Board of Psychological Examiners are 
bound, in contested cases falling under the AP A, by the Idaho Rules of Administrative Procedure 
of the Attorney General. See ID APA 04.11.01.000, 4.11.01.001.02. Idaho Rule of Administrative 
Procedure 04.11.01.791.02 states a petition for judicial review of a final order in a contested case 
must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of either 1) the denial of the petition for reconsideration 
or 2) the failure within twenty-one (21) days to grant or deny the petition for reconsideration. 
Petitions for Judicial Review are also governed by the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 84. Idaho Rule 
of Civil Procedure 84(n) states, in pertinent part: 
The failure to physically file a petition for judicial review or cross-
petition for judicial review with the district court within the time 
limits prescribed by statute and these rules shall be jurisdictional and 
shall cause automatic dismissal of the petition for judicial review 
upon motion of any party, or upon initiative of the district court .... 
In this case, Wright filed her Petition on May 16, 2006, over a year after the date the 
first Final Order was entered by the Board in April 2005. After the Board entered its Final Order on 
April 22, 2005, Wright thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, which was dated April 28, 2005, 
and received by the Board on May 3, 2005. The record does not reflect any action was taken on the 
motion (R., p. 12) and therefore, it was deemed denied by operation of law no later than May 24, 
2005. See I.C. § 67-5246(4); See also IDAPA 04.ll.0l.740.02(a). 
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Wright then had twenty-eight days from that date to file a Petition for Judicial 
Review, which equated to a deadline of June 21, 2005. Wright's Petition, filed on May 16, 2006, 
was filed almost a year late. Wright's Petition is untimely and must be denied as it to its arguments 
regarding the first Final Order. 
Idaho Code Section 67-5273 governs the time for filing petitions for judicial review, 
and provides in subsection 3 that a petition for judicial review of a final agency action, other than 
a rule or order, must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the agency action. Final Orders are 
defined in IDAPA 04.11.01.740.01 as: 
Final orders are preliminary orders that have become final under Rule 
730 pursuant to Section 67-5245, Idaho Code, or orders issued by the 
agency head pursuant to Section 67-5246, Idaho Code. Emergency 
orders issued under Section 67-524 7, Idaho Code, shall be designated 
as final orders if the agency will not issue further orders or conduct 
further proceedings in the matter. 
By its very title and the provisions governing the order, first Final Order was issued 
by the board chair following receipt and the Board's review of the hearing officer's recommended 
order and therefore clearly constitutes a final order issued pursuant to I.C. § 67-5246. As such, the 
timeline for the petition for judicial review is governed by the timing set forth in I.C. § 67-5273(3). 
Wright failed to file within the timing set forth therein, and therefore her Petition must be deemed 
untimely as it applies to the first Final Order. 
2. Appellant's Arguments on Appeal Regarding .Judicial Review of the 
2005 Final Order Are Improper 
It should be noted that on appeal Appellant has abandoned arguments she made 
before the District Court below with respect to her contention that language in the second Final 
Order somehow gave her the right to appeal any previous Final Order the Board had made against 
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Appellant. The District Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order, R., pp. 15 - 17, summarizes 
Appellant's argument made in this respect before the District Court and reflects that Court's proper 
rejection of the same. Appellant has not raised this issue in her brief on appeal. 
For the first time on appeal Appellant now argues that in issuing the second Final 
Order in April 2006 the Board somehow amended the 2005 Final Order, and that "[i]f the Board has 
the authority to amend it's (sic) order to add additional discipline for a violation of the April 22, 
2005 Order, it is appropriate for the Court to review the Order of April 22, 2005." Appellant's Brief, 
p. 10. This argument is frivolous and completely without merit. 
First, Appellant never made this argument to the District Court below and so this 
Court has no ruling on that argument by the District Court to review. "It is fundamental that this 
Court will not consider issues not raised in the court below and raised for the first time on appeal." 
Smith v. State, 2009 WL 368613 *19 (Idaho). "This Court has also stated that 'to raise an issue on 
appeal, the record must contain an adverse ruling to form the basis for assignment of error and this 
Court will not consider or review an issue raised for the first time on appeal."' Id. Appellant did not 
contend to the District Court in the proceeding below that the 2005 Order was reviewable because 
the 2006 Order somehow amended that prior order, and accordingly the District Court did not make 
any ruling upon that contention. As such, there is no assignment of error by Appellant that any 
determination by the District Court as to that issue was wrong, and Appellant is improperly 
attempting to raise it for the first time before this Court. 
Second, Appellant cites no authority to support her claim that if an agency amends 
a part of a prior Final Order in any way this then entitles a party to that order to subject the entire 
order to judicial review anew. Appellant provides nothing but a string of empty rhetorical questions 
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and statements in her brief to support her claim that the 2005 Final Order is reviewable because it 
was purportedly amended by the 2006 Order. An "appellate court will not consider issues cited on 
appeal that are not supported by propositions of law [and] authority .... " Plummer v. City of 
Fruitland, 140 Idaho 1, 7, 89 P.3d 841,847 (2003) (citing Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 
Idaho 330, 350, 986 P.2d 996, 1016 (1999)). 
Third, and most importantly, the Board never amended the 2005 Final Order. The 
2006 Final Order in no way changed any of the findings, conclusions, or penalties contained in the 
Board's 2005 Final Order. The purpose of the 2006 Final Order was to enforce the terms of the 2005 
Order and to address new findings that Appellant was practicing psychology without a valid license. 1 
There is nothing in the record that supports Appellant's claim that the 2005 Order has ever been 
amended.2 
Given the above, Appellant's arguments that the 2005 Final Order was reviewable 
by the District Court are frivolous and improperly raised on appeal. Appellant clearly forfeited her 
right to appeal the Board's 2005 Final Order by waiting almost a year to file anything with the 
District Court contending that this prior order was improper. 
1It is Respondent's contention that Appellant has failed to enter any of the underlying proceedings into the 
Record before this Court except that which is contained in the Clerk's Record and Transcript on appeal. See Section 
A.3, infra. The very text of the 2005 and 2006 Final Orders are not contained within this Record, and accordingly 
this Court cannot properly view this evidence to determine whether the 2006 Order did or did not amend the 2005 
Order. 
2 Aside from the fact that it is not properly contained within the record on appeal, Footnote 3 to Appellant's 
brief, upon which Appellant relies for her contention that the 2006 Order amended the 2005 Order, entirely fails to 
support that allegation. To the contrary, the language quoted clearly states that the 2006 Order was meant to enforce 
the 2005 Order, not amend it. 
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3. If this Court Determines That Appellant's Petition From the First Final 
Order Was Timely, Then Remand to the District Court is Necessary 
Appellant has raised numerous issues in her Brief regarding the validity of the First 
Final Order imposed by the Board on April 22, 2005. Specifically, Appellant has raised fourteen 
(14) separate issues on appeal identified as Issues 3.1 through 3.5B in Appellant's Brief regarding 
the substance of the this Final First Order. 3 These issues pertain to whether the Hearing Officer's 
determination that Appellant had violated Idaho Code § 54-2909( d) and ( e) ( and specifically Sections 
4.07(a) and (b) of the 1992 Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct published by 
the American Psychology Association) by having an improper relationship with a former client was 
proper, and whether the Board's decision to adopt the Hearing Officer's findings was arbitrary and 
capricious and based on the record. Appellant is now asking this Court to rule upon the substance 
of this 2005 Final Order, requesting that this Court review the specific findings and conclusions 
issued by the Hearing Officer and adopted by the Board in its Final Order. This request is improper 
and outside this Court's current purview of this case. 
As previously established, the 2005 Final Order falls outside the scope of this Court's 
jurisdiction to review where Appellant failed to timely file a petition for judicial review of this order. 
In adjudicating Appellant's request to review the 2005 Final Order, the District Court below properly 
found in this present proceeding that it lacked the jurisdiction to review the 2005 Final Order, and 
consequently it did not review or rule upon any of Appellant's issues with respect to the substance 
of that Order. Accordingly, this Court cannot now affirm or reverse the decision of the District 
Court with respect to the substance of the 2005 Final Order where the District Court did not rule on 
3Jndeed, Appellanl uses the majority of her Appellant's Brief discussing these issues. 
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those issues raised by Appellant at tliat time and has thus provided no decision on these issues for 
this Court to review. See Smith, 2009 WL 368613 *19 (Idaho), supra. In other words, there is no 
decision by the District Court regarding the substance of the 2005 Final Order for this appellate 
Court to review because the District Court found it had no jurisdiction to issue such a determination. 
Furthermore, there is no record of the proceeding underlying the 2005 Final Order 
before this Court to review on appeal, and given the factual complexity of the fourteen issues 
Appellant has raised with regards to the 2005 proceeding it would be impossible for this Court to 
pass upon the various issues raised by Appellant without such a record. Though in her brief 
Appellant cites numerous times to the underlying record before the Board when it issued the 2005 
Final Order, that underlying record is not included in the Clerk's Record on appeal. Accordingly, 
any reference to or quotation of the underlying agency record by Appellant is improper and should 
be disregarded by this Court because it has not been properly made a part of the Clerk's Record on 
appeal. 
Appellant asks this Court to review and undo the Hearing Officer's decision without 
having given this Court the ability to even review that very decision. This Court has established: 
"The party appealing the decision of the district court bears the burden of ensuring that this Court 
is provided a sufficient record for review of the district court's decision." Gibson v. Ada County, 
138 Idaho 787, 790, 69 P.3d 1048, 1051 (2003). Appellant has failed to provide any of the 
underlying record to this Court on appeal, and accordingly even if this Court were to rule it could 
review the Board's 2005 decision it has no record with which to do so. 
Given the above, if this Court finds that the District Court did err in determining it 
lacked jurisdiction to review the 2005 Final Order, then the only proper course of action would be 
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for this Court to then remand this case back to the District Court to review the agency's record and 
determine the particular issues Appellant has raised with respect to the Hearing Officer's findings 
and conclusions and the Board's adoption of the same. 
B. The Board's Second Final Order, dated April 19. 2006, Was Not In Excess of 
the Board's Statutory Authority. 
Appellant maintains in her brief that the District Court erred when it affirmed the 
2006 Final Order, claiming that Order exceeded the Board's statutory authority by punishing 
Appellant for failing to comply with the 2005 Final Order. This contention mischaracterizes the 
nature of the District Court's decision. As the District Court's Memorandum Decision plainly states, 
in issuing the 2006 Final Order 
the Board formally adopted the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law which found Ms. Wright had continued to practice psychology after her 
license had been suspended and had failed to pay the fine, costs and fees as ordered 
in the 2005 Final Order. The Board therein suspended Ms. Wright's license for five 
(5) years from the date of the Order and conditioned her eligibility for reinstatement 
on proof of full compliance with the terms of the Board's 2005 Final Order. 
R., p. 13. Thus, the disciplinary measure in the form of license suspension meted by the 2006 Final 
Order was in response to two separate violations found by the Board: 1) Appellant's having practiced 
psychology without a license following the 2005 Final Order, and 2) Appellant's failure to abide by 
the 2005 Final Order by not paying the fine, fees, and costs imposed in that Order. 
In response to Appellant's contention that the Board lacked authority to issue this 
discipline, the District Court found: 
It is clear from the statutory scheme that, in addition to criminal prosecution, the 
Board has the authority to suspend a license previously issued if the person licensed 
is found to be in violation of any statutory provision within the chapter, including 
LC. § 54-2310. While the Court finds no authority that would allow the Board to 
impose additional penalties against Wright for failing to pay the fine and/or fees and 
costs imposed in the 2005 Final Order, the Court does find the Board had authority 
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to further suspend Petitioner Wright's license upon its finding that she had continued 
to practice psychology without a valid license. That finding is supported by the 
record as Petitioner offered no defense or challenge to the allegation at the hearing. 
Therefore, the Board did not exceed its authority when, in its 2006 Final Order, it 
suspended Petitioner Wright's license for five (5) years after it found she was in 
violation of J.C. §§ 54-2303 and 54-2310, in that she was practicing psychology, as 
defined in LC. § 54-2302([), after her license had been suspended. 
R., p. 10 ( emphasis in original). Thus, while the District Court found the Board did not have the 
right to impose further discipline on Appellant for her failure to pay the fine, fees, and costs imposed 
by the 2005 Final Order, the District Court did uphold the Board's authority to impose disciplinary 
measures against Appellant for continuing to practice psychology after the 2005 Final Order 
suspended her license. The Board has not appealed the District Court's ruling as to its ability to 
impose further discipline upon Appellant for her failure to pay the fine, fees, and costs, and thus that 
issue is not on appeal before this Court. 
Idaho Code Section 54-2305 gives the Board authority to conduct hearings upon 
complaints concerning violations of the provisions of the act and to cause the prosecution and 
enjoinder of all such violations. I.C. § 54-2305(d). Idaho Code Section 54-2303 provides, "It shall 
be unlawful for any person to practice or offer to practice psychology, or to represent himself to be 
a psychologist, unless he shall first obtain a license pursuant to this act, except as hereinafter 
provided." Reading these two sections in pari materia, the Board has authority to discipline 
licensees who continue to practice, offer to practice, or represent themselves as a psychologist when 
not authorized. That is exactly what the evidence establishes Wright was doing in this case 
following the Board's Final Order suspending her license. 
Wright argues that enforcement of this provision is restricted to criminal actions 
brought by prosecutors. While it is true that the Act provides for enforcement by prosecutors, 
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nowhere does the law state that is the only means of enforcement. See I.C. § 54-2311. Wright's 
argument in this regard is without merit. The Board had authority to impose discipline for her 
continued practice without a license. As the District Court found, "the legislature may establish a 
criminal penalty and a separate civil penalty for the same act." R., p. 9, citing State v. McKeeth, 136 
Idaho 619, 38 P.3d 1275 (Ct.App. 2001) and Garcia v. State Tax Comm'n, 136 Idaho 610, 38 P.3d 
1266 (2002). 
Appellant's contention that "[t]here is no statutory authority for the Board to impose 
additional discipline based on a licensed psychologist's failure to follow Board orders" (App. Br., 
p. 8) assumes that the only authority upon which the Board rests for its position that Appellant 
should not have practiced psychology after the Board's 2005 Final Order is that Order itself. This 
is incorrect. The Board rested not upon its own Order, but upon state statute-I.C. § 54-2310-in 
finding a violation in Appellant's actions. As such, the Board has authority under I.C. §§ 54-2305(d) 
and 54-2309 to impose a suspension upon Appellant's license to practice psychology for violating 
this statute. 
In Appellant's insistence that "the Board did not seek to discipline Dr. Wright for 
additional allegedly unethical acts, only for a violation of the Board's Order" (App. Br., p. 9), 
Appellant would apparently have this Court believe that the practice of psychology without a valid 
license is not an unethical act. This finding by the Board that Appellant continued practicing 
psychology after her license was suspended by the 2005 Final Order-a charge Appellant declined 
to deny or defend herself against-is certainly "an act specifically prohibited by statute or rule" (App. 
Br., p. 9) that the Board explicitly found and for which it suspended Appellant's license. 
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The District Court's decision as to this issue is proper, and Appellant's arguments to 
the contrary are unavailing and without merit. 
c. Appellant is Not Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees. 
Appellant argues she is entitled to costs and attorney fees pursuant to 12-117 because 
the Board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. A prerequisite to the award of fees under 
12-117 is that one be a prevailing party. See Spencer v. Kootenai County, 2008 WL 597661 at *10 
(Sup. Ct. Mar. 6, 2008). Wright is not the prevailing party. The Board's actions were well grounded 
in law and fact. Therefore, her argument for fees is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, this Court should affirm the District Court's decision 
in total. Appellant has failed to set forth any meritorious argument as to why the District Court's 
decision was in error or should be reversed. Further, this Court should award the Respondent Board 
its attorney fees and costs on appeal under LC. § 12-117 where the Appellant's arguments have no 
valid basis in law or fact. 
DATED this 2nd day of March, 2009. 
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